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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030332-CA
v.
SANTIAGO DIAZ CRESPO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions on two counts of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, both third degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Should this Court reject defendant's unpreserved discovery claims
alleging that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion where
defendant cannot show that the evidence should have been produced
under either Brady or rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?
This Court "'review[s] rulings on motions for a mistrial based on prosecutorial
misconduct [i.e. discovery violations] for abuse of discretion.'" State v. Martinez, 2002
UT App 126, ^ 16, 47 P.3d 115 (alterations in original) (citation omitted); see also State
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994). However, where defendant's discovery
claims were not preserved below, they may only be reviewed for plain error. To establish

plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial court erred; (2) the error should have
been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 120809 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions and rules of criminal procedure
are attached at Addendum A:
United States Const. Amend. XIV, § 1;
Utah Const, art. I, § 7;
Utah R. Crim. P. 16.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 27, 2002, defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, both third degree felonies (R. 2-3). Defendant's
jury trial was held on February 11, 2003 (R. 134). After the State's case-in-chief,
defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the State had failed to provide him with a
police report in a related but separate case (R. 134:69-71). The trial court denied
defendant's motion (R. 134:72). Defendant was subsequently convicted as charged (R.
96-97, 109-110; R. 134:101). He was then sentenced to concurrent terms of zero-to-five
years on his convictions (R. 109-110). Defendant timely appealed (R. 114).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime. On September 19, 2002, a concerned citizen called the Salt Lake City
Police Department to complain about suspicious activity at a downtown apartment
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complex (R. 134:20-21). Sergeant Michael Ross, Detective Nicholas Schneider, and one
other officer responded (R. 134:21).
After knocking at the door and briefly talking with the renter named Lucero, the
three officers entered the apartment (R. 134:21-22). Sergeant Ross was the first to follow
Lucero into the apartment (R. 134:21-22). Lucero stood to the right of the door in the
living room (R. 134:23-24). Ross saw several other people also in the living room (R.
134:22-23). Ross then saw defendant standing alone in the kitchen area, which was
separated from the living room by a small island (R. 134:22-23).
As Sergeant Ross entered the apartment, defendant put his hands into his pants
pockets (R. 134:26). Concerned for his and his fellow officers' safety, Ross told
defendant to keep his hands out where they could be seen (R. 134:26). Defendant pulled
his hands out of his pockets and swung them down (R. 134:26). As he did so, Sergeant
Ross "saw the two plastic twist[s] fall out of his hand" (R. 134:26, 30, 35, 46, 52).
Defendant was immediately arrested (R. 134:57). The officers then field tested the two
twists (R. 134:31; St. Exh. 5). One tested positive for cocaine; the other tested positive
for heroin (R. 134:31; St. Exh. 5).
Preliminary hearing testimony. At defendant's preliminary hearing, Detective
Schneider testified that he and two other officers went to a Salt Lake apartment on
September 19, 2002 in response to a citizen's complaint alleging possible drug activity
(R. 137:4). When Sergeant Ross knocked on the door, a man named Lucero opened the
door and explained that he was the renter (R. 137:4). After a brief conversation, Lucero
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let the officers into his small apartment (R. 137:4-5). Once inside, Detective Schneider
noticed numerous people sitting in the living room and defendant standing in the kitchen
(R. 137:5). Sergeant Ross then asked defendant to take his hands out of his pocket (R.
137:5). As defendant did, Sergeant Ross saw two twists fall onto the floor out of
defendant's pocket (R. 137:5). One twist field-tested positive for heroine; the other fieldtested positive for cocaine (R. 137:7).
On cross-examination, Detective Schneider testified that Sergeant Ross had filed a
report in the case (R. 137:7). He also testified that the third officer present at the scene
took the twists into evidence (R. 137:8). Defendant did not ask Schneider whether he or
any other officer had identified or talked with the other people in the living room
(R.137:7-9). He only asked the prosecutor for a copy of Ross's report (R. 137:7). The
prosecutor indicated that he wasn't sure he had a copy of the report but that he would
check (R. 137:7-8). The prosecutor provided defendant with a copy of Ross's report a
week later (R. 24).
The trial. Defendant fs opening statement. In his opening statement at trial,
defense counsel noted that there were numerous other people in the apartment when
defendant was arrested, including Lucero and a man named Pollock1 (R. 134:16).
However, counsel continued, the State would produce no evidence from them concerning
the twists or who owned them (R. 134:16). The reason, counsel argued, was because the
officers never asked Lucero or Pollock about them (R. 134:16-17). Nor, according to
!

In the transcript, this man is initially identified as Pullet (R. 134:16). This person
is identified later in the transcript as Pollock (R. 134:70).
4

defense counsel, could the officers tell the jurors the other persons' names because they
never asked (R. 134:16-17).
Defense counsel then told the jury to pay careful attention to Sergeant Ross's
testimony because he was the only person to see defendant drop the twists (R. 134:19).
Given all the people in the apartment and what they might be doing, counsel asked, "[d]id
[Sergeant Ross] see this man drop this or does he think he saw him drop it?" (R. 134:19).
Trial testimony. Sergeant Ross was the first person to testify at defendant's trial
(R. 134:19). Ross explained his entry into Lucero's apartment, where the different people
were situated in the apartment, and the circumstances under which he saw defendant drop
the drugs (R. 134:21-26, 30, 32). Ross testified that before dropping the drugs, defendant
had "a deer-in-a-headlight look, very surprised to see me walk in the door" (R. 134:51).
Moreover, although there were several people in the apartment living room at the time, no
one else was in the kitchen area when defendant dropped the twists (R. 134:40).
Ross then testified that he noticed a lot of narcotic paraphernalia located around
the house, including where the other people were in the living room (R. 134:32, 42). In
fact, two of the people in the living room were subsequently charged with paraphernalia
violations (R. 134:43). According to Ross, Detective Schneider would have gotten their
names, as well as the names of the other people who were in the apartment living room at
the time (R. 134:51).
Detective Schneider testified that, although he did not see defendant drop the
twists, he took custody of defendant at Ross's instruction (R. 134:55, 57). At the time,
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defendant was the only person in the kitchen, everyone else was in the living ioom area
several feet away (R. 134:54, 56). No one was in any other room in the apartment,
including the bathroom (R. 134:39, 63).
On cross-examination, Schneider reiterated that at least two other people in the
apartment—Lucero and Pollock—were arrested dunng the incident on paraphernalia
charges (R. 134:64). Their names, as well as the names of the other people in the living
room, were recorded in a police report filed in connection with the paraphernalia cases
(R. 134:65-66).
On re-direct, Schneider explained that the paraphernalia cases were separated from
defendant's because it is easier to file charges on each individual when there are separate
incidents of drug possession or paraphernalia possession (R. 134:69).
Defendant }s mistrial motion. After Schneider's testimony, the State rested (R.
134:69). The trial court then excused the jury, and defendant moved "either for a mistnal
or dismissal" because he had not received a copy of the report Schneider had filed in the
paraphernalia cases and, although defendant was aware of Lucero and Pollock, "it sounds
like there's some potential witnesses that could be out there, some names of people that I
don't know who they are" (R. 134:69-70).
The trial court noted that because defense counsel knew that others had been
arrested at the scene and that at least five people were present at the time, she could have
obtained the names of those people (R. 134:70). When defense counsel intimated that she
had been misled dunng the preliminary heanng because Schneider had testified that he
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had never obtained the other persons' names, the prosecutor correctly noted that no
questions concerning those other persons' identities were asked during the preliminary
hearing (R. 134:71). The prosecutor then argued that he was unaware of the
paraphernalia report, which had not become part of his file because it was not part of this
case(R. 134:72).
The trial court ruled:
Well, the testimony so far was that [defendant] was somewhat
isolated because of the counter top and everyone was at least
somewhere between two to five feet away. I don't see how it would
be relevant to his defense [and] I don't think he's prejudiced by it.
I'm going to deny the motion.
(R. 134:72).
Defendant's testimony. In his defense, defendant testified that he was at Lucero's
apartment only to pick up a friend, Maria (R. 134:74, 78). When Maria indicated that she
would not be ready for a few minutes, defendant sat down and drank a beer another
person in the apartment had brought him (R. 134:74, 79). When defendant finished the
beer, he was told he could go into the kitchen to get another (R. 134:74). Another person
was initially in the kitchen with defendant, but that person then went into the bathroom
(R. 134:79).
While defendant was still in the kitchen, the officers arrived (R. 134:74).
Defendant had one hand on his beer and the other in his pocket when they arrived (R.
134:76). When the officers told him to remove his hand from his pocket, he put his beer
on the counter and took his hand out (R. 134:76). He did not toss any twists at that time
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(R. 134:77). In fact, he was not even aware of them until one of the officers said that he
had found them on the floor and that they belonged to defendant (R. 134:77).
Defendant testified that he had been in the apartment for only three to five minutes
when the police arrived (R. 134:75).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the prosecution committed a discovery violation under both
Brady v. Maryland and rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, when it did not
disclose the existence of the police report Detective Schneider filed in the paraphernalia
cases. Defendant claims that this discovery violation prejudiced him because the report
contained the names of the other people who were in Lucero's apartment when defendant
was arrested, and those people might have had "potentially exculpatory evidence." Thus,
defendant claims, the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his motion for
mistrial or dismissal based on the alleged violation.
Before this Court will consider a claim on appeal, defendant must show that the
claim was preserved below. Otherwise, the claim will be considered only if defendant
establishes that plain error or exceptional circumstances justify its review. Here,
defendant did not preserve his discovery claims below. Moreover, he does not argue
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Consequently, this Court should not
consider defendant's claims.
Even if this Court reaches defendant's claims, they may be reviewed only for plain
error. To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that
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the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial
to him. Here, defendant cannot establish plain error on either of his claims.
To establish a Brady claim, defendant must show both that he could not have
obtained the information through his own diligence and that the omitted information was
material and exculpatory. Defendant cannot make either showing here. First, where
defendant personally knew at least one of the people, Maria, who was in the apartment at
the time he was arrested, and also knew the names both of the apartment renter and the
other person who was arrested on paraphernalia charges that day, defendant cannot show
that the information he claims should have been disclosed—i.e., the names of the other
persons present in the apartment when he was arrested—was unavailable to him through
other sources. Second, where defendant has not included either a copy of the police
report or any information concerning what testimony, if any, the witnesses named therein
had to offer concerning the drug twists, defendant cannot show that the undisclosed
evidence was material and exculpatory. Consequently, defendant's Brady claim fails.
To establish a discovery violation under rule 16, defendant must show that he did
not know of the existence of the item that the prosecutor failed to disclose, that the
discovery request he submitted to the prosecutor encompassed the undisclosed item, and
that the failure to disclose the item prejudiced him. Again, defendant cannot make those
showings here. First, defendant has not shown why, when he knew at least three of the
five other people in the apartment when he was arrested, he could not have obtained the
names of the other two without the omitted police report. Second, defendant has not
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shown why, based on the discovery request he made in this case, the prosecutor was
required to provide him with either the names of those people or a copy of the police
report that allegedly contained them. Finally, where defendant could have sought the
witnesses' names on his own and where defendant has placed nothing in the record
indicating those witnesses would have helped his case, defendant has not shown he was
prejudiced by the alleged nondisclosure. Defendant's rule 16 claim, therefore, also fails.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED
DISCOVERY CLAIMS WHERE DEFENDANT DOES NOT ARGUE
PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL AND CANNOT SHOW ERROR IN
ANY CASE
Defendant claims that the prosecution committed a discovery violation under both
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when it did not disclose the existence of the police report that Detective
Schneider filed in the paraphernalia cases. Aplt. Br. at 9-19. Defendant claims this
discovery violation prejudiced him because it withheld from him the names of the other
people who were in the apartment when he was arrested and thus "6den[ied] him
knowledge of potentially exculpatory witnesses in his case." Aplt. Br. at 15. Defendant
concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his motion for mistrial
or dismissal based on this alleged discovery violation. See Aplt. Br. at 17-18.
This Court should reject defendant's claims because they were not preserved
below and defendant does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal.
Alternatively, defendant's claims fail on their merits.
10

A.

Defendant's claims fail because he did not raise them below and
does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on
appeal.

The general rule in criminal cases is that '"a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s] on appeal.'" State v. Johnson,
11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^| 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at tnal
must '"be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error'" of which
defendant now complains so that the court '"might have an opportunity to correct [it] if
[the court] deems it proper.'" Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,
460 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted).
This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate,
2000 UT 74, at H 11. Where defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances'
or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, [this Court will] decline to consider it on
appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted); see
also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994).
In this case, defendant moved for a mistrial or dismissal after the State's case-inchief based on surprise, not a discovery violation, arguing that "[apparently there's
another [police] report out there . . . and it sounds like there's some potential witnesses
that could be out there, some names of people that I don't know who they are" (R.
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134:69-70; Addendum B). Defendant never mentioned the state or federal due process
clauses or rule 16 in support of his motion, let alone argued that the prosecutor's failure to
provide the report violated those provisions (R. 134:69-72; Addendum B). Consequently,
defendant's claims were not preserved below.
Thus, defendant's claims can only be reached on appeal if he demonstrates plain
error or exceptional circumstances. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at ^ 11; Pledger, 896 P.2d at
1229; Jennings, 875 P.2d at 570. Because he has alleged neither, his claims fail.
Should this Court nevertheless decide to reach defendant's unperserved claims, it
should only review them for plain error. To demonstrate plain error, defendant must
show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial to him. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 120809 (Utah 1993).
B.

Defendant's Brady claim fails because he cannot show that the
names of those present in the apartment were unavailable to him
through other sources or that those names were exculpatory.

Defendant claims that the State violated his constitutional nghts to due process by
failing to provide him with a copy of a police report filed in a different case which
contained the names of persons who were in the same apartment as defendant when he
was arrested. See Aplt. Br. at 9-15.
Under both the state and federal due process clauses, the "prosecutor has a
constitutional duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence and evidence that is 'so
clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to
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produce.'" State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980) (quoting United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)). The prosecutor has this duty whether or not defendant
actually requests such evidence. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1J 32, 37 P.3d 1073.
A defendant can show that the prosecutor violated this constitutional duty—i.e.,
committed a Brady violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)—only if
he can establish that:
the state suppressed] information that (1) remain[ed] unknown to
the defense both before and throughout trial and (2) is material and
exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a
"reasonable probability" that "the result of the proceeding would
have been different."
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 33 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
However, "c[w]hen . . . a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the
supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the government.'" Id.,
2001 UT 99, K 44 n.l (quoting United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.
1991)).
1.

Defendant's claim fails where he had enough information
to ascertain the alleged Brady material on his own.

A defendant cannot establish a Brady violation "where the evidence at issue is
known to the defense prior to or during trial, where the defendant reasonably should have
known of the evidence, or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its
advantage during trial but failed to do so." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 33. Thus, "'[w]hen . . .
a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed Brady material
on his own, there is no suppression by the government.'" Id., 2001 UT 99, ^| 44 n. 1
13

(quoting United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991)). u[E]vidence is not
improperly withheld if the defense has knowledge of that evidence and defense counsel
simply fails to request it." State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980).
Here, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed a Brady violation when he
did not disclose the police report Detective Schneider filed in the paraphernalia cases
because that report contained the names of the other people who were in the apartment
when defendant was arrested and those people might have been able to help defendant's
case. See Aplt. Br. at 9, 11. Because defendant had sufficient information to, with
reasonable diligence, obtain that information on his own, he has not shown the first prong
of a Brady violation.
According to Sergeant Ross, there were only six people other than police officers
in the apartment when defendant was arrested; two of those six people were defendant
and Lucero, the leaseholder (R. 134:22, 25, 36, 39, 40). According to Detective
Schneider, there were only five other people present, including Lucero and defendant (R.
134:54, 63). Although defendant testified that yet another person was in the bathroom
when the police arrived (R. 134:79), defendant's self-serving testimony was contradicted
by both Sergeant Ross and Detective Schneider (R. 134:39-40, 63). Thus, at most,
defendant was looking for the names of five people, other than himself, who were present
in the apartment when he was arrested.
However, prior to trial, defendant already knew the names of at least three of those
people. Defendant's own trial testimony indicates that one of those people was his friend,
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Maria (R. 134:74). Then, from his preliminary hearing, defendant learned that another
person present—the one who rented the apartment—was named Lucero (R. 137:4; R.
134:16, 70); see also Aplt. Br. at 7 ("Only the report filed in Mr. Crespo's case was
provided to the defense counsel, and it contained the names of only two of the witnesses
interviewed by police at the crime scene.") (citing R. 134 at 70 (defense counsel
acknowledging prior knowledge of Lucero and Pollock)). Finally, as evidenced by his
opening statement, defendant also knew by the time of trial that a third person present
was named Pollock (134:17, 70); see Aplt. Br. at 1:
Thus, by the time of his trial, defendant was at most still looking only for the
names of two of the people who were present in the apartment when he was arrested.
Since Maria was his friend (R. 134:74), defendant could have sought those names from
her. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant asked Maria for those last two names
or that Maria lacked that information.
Alternatively, defendant could have tried to obtain the information from Lucero.
From the preliminary hearing, defendant knew that Lucero was the person who was
renting the apartment in which defendant was arrested (R. 137:4). Since Lucero was the
apartment's renter, Lucero would presumably know the people he let into his apartment.
Moreover, since defendant had gotten to the apartment on his own free will that day (R.
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In fact, Detective Ross's police report, which was provided to defendant, see Aplt.
Br. at 7, not only identified Lucero and Pollock as being in the apartment at the time, but
also specifically identified them as the two people who were arrested on the paraphernalia
charges and provided the case number assigned to those charges. See Police Report at
Addendum C.
15

134:73-74), he apparently knew where he could locate Lucero. Yet, nothing in the record
indicates that defendant asked Lucero for the names of the two unidentified people or that
Lucero lacked that information.
A third avenue open to defendant was to attempt to locate and talk with Pollock.
Defendant could have sought Pollock's contact information from Maria or Lucero.
Again, nothing in the record indicates that defendant pursued this avenue or that it would
have been futile if pursued.
Finally, since the record indicates that defendant apparently knew about the
paraphernalia cases prior to his trial and that Lucero and Pollock were the persons
arrested in those cases (R. 134:16-17, 43, 64-65, 70); see also Aplt. Br. at 7 (referring to
police report in which paraphernalia arrests were listed), defendant could have sought any
police reports generated in those cases to determine whether those reports contained the
names of those two other people. Defendant did not take this route either (R. 134:69-72).
Based on this record, defendant had "enough information to be able to ascertain
the supposed Brady material on his own." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 44. Therefore,
defendant cannot now base a Brady claim on his failure to obtain it. See Jarrell, 608 P.2d
at 225; see also Bisner, 2001 UT 99,ffl[33, 44.
Consequently, defendant's Brady claim fails.
2.

Defendant's claim fails because he cannot show that the
evidence was material and exculpatory.

"Contrary to appellant's claims, the State is not constitutionally compelled to
disclose any and all information which may assist [a] defendant in preparing for trial."
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State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1981) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Rather, as explained above, to establish a Brady violation, defendant must
show that the undisclosed evidence was both constitutionally "material" and "exculpatory
. . . to the defense." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, t 32; see also Workman, 635 P.2d at 52 ("[F]or
undisclosed evidence to be considered as coming within the purview of [Brady], it must
be exculpatory in nature.").
"Evidence is constitutionally material 'if there is a reasonable probability' that the
'result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense.'" State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, t 31, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682). It is exculpatory only if it is "favorable" to the defendant. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,
U 32; see also State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ^ 34, 52 P.3d 451 (holding that where
evidence is inculpatory rather than exculpatory, no Brady claim exists).
Finally, "the 'mere possibility' that undisclosed evidence might favor a defendant
cannot establish a Brady violation." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ 49 (quoting State v. Shaffer,
725 P.2d 1301, 1305-06 (Utah 1986)); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 10910 (1976) ("The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have
helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish
'materiality' in the constitutional sense."); id., All U.S. at 112 n.20 (rejecting argument
that "standard" for materiality "should focus on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on
the defendant's ability to prepare for trial" because inculpatory as well as exculpatory
evidence may affect preparation); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Utah 1983).
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If the "evidence is so speculative that it is impossible to see how it could have affected
the outcome of the trial," the Brady claim must fail. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788
(Utah 1984).
Here, defendant claims that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to
provide him with a copy of the report Detective Schneider filed in the paraphernalia
cases. See Aplt. Br. at 9-14. No copy of Detective Schneider's report appears in the
record. See State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) ("Parties claiming error below
and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support their allegations
with an adequate record."); see also State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 13, 69 P.3d 1278
("When crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed
to support the action of the trial court." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted));
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998).
Thus, the only non-speculative fact we know about the report is that it contains the
names of other individuals who were in the apartment when defendant was arrested (R.
134:66, 69-70). As stated, three of those names were already known to defendant. See
pp. 14-15 supra. Because defendant did not call any of those three people as witnesses at
his trial, the presumption is those witnesses did not have material, exculpatory evidence.
In any case, because defendant knew the names of these people, the nondisclosure of their
names cannot support defendant's Brady claim.
Only two of the people named in the report, therefore, could support defendant's
claim. Because those people—like Maria, Lucero and Pollock—may know nothing about
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defendant's cnme or may only have information that inculpates defendant, their names
alone are not material and exculpatory in the constitutional sense. Defendant simply
cannot show that '"there is a reasonable probability' that the 'result of [defendant's trial]
would have been different'" had defendant known those names. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,
^[ 31 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Indeed, we do not even know whether defendant
would have called these two witnesses if he had known their names. Thus, whether those
witnesses would have provided exculpatory evidence "is so speculative that it is
impossible to see how it could have affected the outcome of the trial." Shabata, 678 P.2d
at 788; see also Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ^ 34.
Defendant attempts to overcome this record deficiency by claiming that "when the
prosecutor withholds the names of witnesses, it is not necessary for the defense to prove
that their testimonies are exculpatory" but only that "they are potentially exculpatory."
Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 33). Defendant reasons that unknown
testimony automatically qualifies as Brady material because it is "potentially
exculpatory." See Aplt. Br. at 11 ("So, the fact that the defense counsel in this case was
unable to provide the trial court with summaries of the witnesses' testimonies does not
justify the prosecutor's failure to provide the names and other known information about
them.").
No authority supports defendant's argument. Indeed, his claim is directly contrary
to the case law cited above. See Agurs, All U.S. 109-110; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ 49,
Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1305-06, Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788, Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1106.
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Bisner, the sole case upon which he relies, see Aplt. Br. at 11, also does not
support this argument. The term "potentially exculpatory" appears only once in Bisner,
and then only as a direct quote from a 6th Circuit Court of Appeals case. See Bisner, 2001
UT 99, U 33 (quoting United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1371 (6th Cir. 1994)
(additional citations omitted)). It appears almost immediately after the court confirms
that Brady applies "both to substantively exculpatory evidence and to that which may be
used for impeachment." Id., 2001 UT 99, ^ 32. And it appears almost immediately
before the court confirms that "a Brady violation occurs only where the state suppresses
information t h a t . . . is material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have
created a 'reasonable probability' that 'the result of the proceeding would have been
different.'" Id., 2001 UT 99, \ 33 (emphasis added).
In this context, there are only two possible interpretations of "potentially
exculpatory." The first merely recognizes that all exculpatory evidence is only
potentially exculpatory until the jury accepts it as fact. The second, possible where
Bisner involved impeachment rather than direct exculpatory evidence, merely recognizes
that Brady reaches not only evidence with an obvious exculpatory value, but also
impeachment evidence, which, because it is not directly favorable to a defendant, is not
strictly-speaking exculpatory, but only potentially so.
In short, nothing in either Bisner or the case from which the "potentially
exculpatory" language is quoted supports defendant's contention that Brady applies to all
undisclosed information so long as its unknown nature holds out the possibility that it
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might be exculpatory. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 31-40; see also Mullins, 22 F.3d at
1370-73; Thigpen v. State, 825 So.2d 241, 245 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (rejecting Brady
claim where defendant "did not identify any exculpatory evidence that Timothy
Worsham, the witness whose name allegedly was not disclosed, could have provided")
(footnote omitted), cert, denied (Ala. Jan. 25, 2002). To the contrary, as explained above,
the clear import of Brady and its progeny, including Bisner, is that the "mere possibility"
that undisclosed evidence might be exculpatory can never establish a Brady violation.
See Agurs, 427 U.S. 109-110; Bisner, 2001 UT 99,ffi[31-40; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \ 49,
Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1305-06, Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788, Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1106.
Significantly, defendant was not without a means by which to place that evidence
on the record. For instance, instead of requesting the drastic remedies of mistrial or
dismissal, defendant could have sought a continuance to obtain a copy of the report,
investigate any potential witnesses identified therein, and then call them at trial or at least
proffer their testimony in support of his discovery claim. See, e.g.,, State v.
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990) (suggesting there is hierarchy of
remedies for discovery violations; holding that trial court does not abuse its discretion in
rejecting dismissal remedy when defendant has failed to seek "other, less harsh
remedies"). Alternatively, defendant could have sought the undisclosed information after
trial and then filed a motion for new trial and requested an evidentiary hearing thereon.
Finally, defendant could on appeal have alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel
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and requested a remand under rule 23B to develop a factual record in support of his
claim ^
Because defendant pursued none of these options, this Court is left with mere
speculation as to whether the two missing witnesses may have helped defendant's case
As already stated, "the 'mere possibility' that undisclosed evidence might favor a
defendant cannot establish a Brady violation." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 49 (citation
omitted).
Consequently, defendant's Brady claim fails.
C.

Defendant's rule 16 claim fails because defendant should have
been aware of the police report and the names it contained
before trial; because such information was not encompassed
within his discovery request; and because, in any case, he has not
made the necessary showing of prejudice to support his claim.

Defendant alternatively claims that the State's failure to provide him with a copy
of Detective Schneider's report m the paraphernalia cases "violated the Discovery Rule,

3

Perhaps because of the need to have the disputed evidence in the record, all the
discovery cases m Utah found by the State address situations in which the specific nature
of the disputed evidence was either placed on the record at tnal or was placed on the
record through another method, usually a post-trial motion. See, e g , State v Hopkins,
1999 UT 98,1f 21, 989 P.2d 1065 (evidence presented at tnal); State v Whittle, 1999 UT
96, H 23, 989 P.2d 52 (evidence disclosed at tnal); State v Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 400
(Utah 1994) (evidence presented dunng tnal); State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah
1987) (evidence presented dunng tnal); State v Fierst, 692 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1984)
(unclear how evidence became part of record but substance of disputed evidence clearly
established), State v Perez, 2002 UT App 211, U 37, 52 P.3d 451 (evidence presented at
tnal), State v Martinez, 2002 UT App 126,ffij 12-13, 47 P.3d 115 (eudence presented at
trial), State v Rugebregt, 965 P 2d 518, 522 (Utah App 1998) (evidence presented at
trial), State v Christofferson, 793 P 2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1990) (evidence presented
dunng trial), State v Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah App. 1989) (evidence presented
dunng tnal)
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Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Aplt. Br. at 15. Specifically,
defendant claims that, because he "made a formal discovery request pursuant to Rule 16"
and "asked for c[a]ny evidence which tends to negate . . . or mitigate' his guilt, a list of all
witnesses the State intended to call for trial, along with their personal contact information,
and any reports involved in the prosecution or investigation of this case," the police report
"containing the names of witnesses should have been provided to him." Aplt. Br. at 15.
Defendant's alternative claim also lacks merits.
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(a)

(b)

Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to
the defense upon request the following material or
information of which he has knowledge:
(1)

relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or codefendants;

(2)

the criminal record of the defendant;

(3)

physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendant;

(4)

evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for
reduced punishment; and

(5)

any other item of evidence which the court determines
on good cause shown should be made available to the
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense.

The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as
practicable following the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
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Utah R. Cnm. P. 16 (emphasis added).
Thus, while Brady or due process requires a prosecutor to disclose material
exculpatory evidence whether or not the defense requests it, see State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, H 32, 37 P.3d 1073, rule 16 requires a prosecutor to make disclosures only upon
request, see Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a).
To make out a discovery claim under rule 16, defendant must first show that "the
scope of his request encompassed the omitted items and that the State undertook an
unqualified obligation to provide them." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^ 20, 989 P.2d
1065. He must then "make a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired
the defense." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987).
However, as with a Brady claim, a "'prosecutor cannot be cited for a discovery
violation [under rule 16] where the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the item
that the State failed to disclose.'" State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 25, 989 P.2d 52 (quoting
approvingly State v. White, 931 S.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
1.

Defendant's claim fails because he knew or should have
known about the police report before trial and could have
sought it on his own.

"The prosecution has a duty to make a correct and complete disclosure, but
defense counsel also has an affirmative duty to make a reasonable investigation." State v.
Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). Thus, a "'prosecutor cannot be cited for a
discovery violation where the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the item that
the State failed to disclose.'" Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^ 25 (citation omitted).
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As previously discussed, defendant had sufficient information before trial to seek
the information he now claims should have been provided See pp 15-16 supra
Consequently, defendant's rule 16 discovery claim fails.
2.

Defendant's claim fails because his discovery request did
not encompass a police report filed in a different case.

As previously discussed, rule 16 requires a prosecutor to make disclosures only
upon request See Utah R Com P 16(a). '"Where. . matenal [requested in discovery]
is not covered by the detailed descriptions m subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4), which
mandate disclosure upon request, subsection (a)(5), the catch-all provision, applies It
requires disclosure of the matenal sought only to the extent ordered by the tnal court'"
State v Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^ 18, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting State v Knight, 734 P.2d
913,916 (Utah 1987)). "However, where no court order has been imposed and the
prosecutor undertakes to voluntanly respond to a discovery request, the prosecutor 'must
produce all of the matenal requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the
request with respect to which no responsive matenal will be provided '" Id (quoting
Knight, 734 P.2d at 916-17).
To make out a rule 16 violation "[u]nder the pnnciples outlined in Knight,
[defendant] must demonstrate that the scope of his request encompassed the omitted items
and that the State undertook an unqualified obligation to provide them." Hopkins, 1999
UT 98, H 20.
In this case, the record does not clearly indicate whether the State voluntanly
responded to defendant's discovery request or whether the State qualified its response in
25

any way. Thus, the State does not concede on this record that it "undertook an
unqualified obligation to provide [defendant with his requested information]." Hopkins,
1999 UT 98,^)20.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor did undertake such a duty, however,
defendant must still show "that the scope of his request encompassed the omitted items."
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, % 20. Defendant has not made that showing here.
Defendant cites the following parts of his discovery request, see Aplt. Br. at 15, as
supporting his discovery claim:
1.

Any evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or
mitigate the degree of the offense that has been
discovered by any member of the agencies involved in
the investigation or prosecution of the above-entitled
case.

2.

A list of all the witnesses that the State intends to call for trial
in the above-entitled matter, their addresses, telephone
numbers and the adult and juvenile criminal records.

3.

Any recordings, reports, transcripts or reports [sic] about
statements in possession of any member or group involved in
the prosecution of the investigation of the above-entitled case
taken from any of the witnesses listed in number 2.

8.

Any police or investigative reports excluding the Salt Lake
District Attorney's work product, made during the course of
the investigation or prosecution of this case.

(R. 16-18). None of these requests "encompass[] the omitted item[]." Hopkins, 1999 UT
98, T] 20. First, as previously discussed, no copy of the omitted police report appears in
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the record, and all that is known about it is that it contains the names of other people who
were in the apartment when defendant was arrested. See p. 18 supra. Thus, defendant
cannot show that the omitted report should have been provided because it "tend[ed] to
negate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the
degree of the offense that has been discovered by any member of the agencies involved in
the investigation or prosecution of the above-entitled case" (R. 16). See pp. 16-21 supra.
Second, nothing in the record indicates that the State intended to call any of the
people listed in that report as witnesses at defendant's trial. Thus, defendant cannot show
that the State failed to provide defendant with "[a] list of all the witnesses that the State
intend[ed] to call for trial" or "[a]ny recordings, reports, [or] transcripts . . . about
statements . . . taken from any of the witnesses listed in number 2"(R. 16).
Finally, everything in the record indicates that the officers involved in this case
believed that their investigation of the crime involving defendant was essentially
complete upon defendant's arrest and was separate from the crimes involving the people
in the living room (R. 134:25, 40 (Sergeant Ross testifying that defendant was only
person in kitchen); R. 134:46 (Ross testifying that he did not include defendant's
exculpatory statement in police report because "I watched it. I saw it happen. There was
no doubt in my mind whatsoever what he did."); R. 134:46-47 (Ross testifying that report
in defendant's case was only report he wrote); R. 134:50 (Ross testifying that he did not
see need to have defendant tested for drugs where "It had nothing to do with this case in
my opinion. I saw him throw dope on the ground."); R. 134:52 (Ross explaining that no
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one else was charged with possession because defendant "was the individual ] observed
throw the narcotics to the ground."); R. 134:43-45, 52 (Ross explaining that he did not
read defendant his rights because he did not intend to interview defendant); R. 134:55,
61-62 (Detective Schneider indicating he was told by Ross to hold onto defendant and
that Ross explained by "pointing] out" the plastic twists on the ground); R. 134:56
(Schneider explaining relative positions of people in apartment); R. 134:57 (Schneider
explaining that he "just took custody of the defendant and just pretty much held him and
the evidence there"); R. 134:57 (Schneider testifying that a different detective took the
information concerning the other people in the apartment); R. 134:58-59 (Schneider
identifying paraphernalia found in living room and on kitchen counter and testifying that
defendant was not charged with possession of those items); R. 134:63 (Schneider
testifying that defendant was only person in kitchen area); R. 134:65-66 (Schneider
testifying that he got the names of the individuals present in the living room but that he
included them in report for paraphernalia cases); R. 134:68 (Schneider distinguishing
between evidence in defendant's case and evidence in paraphernalia cases filed under
different case number); R. 134:69 (Schneider explaining: "It's easier to file charges with
the courts when there are separate incidents in regard to the possession or the
paraphernalia when it's different individuals. Each individual for the most part gets their
own case.")).
Where defendant was seen in possession of cocaine and heroine in the kitchen of
an apartment and two separate individuals were found in possession of drug paraphernalia
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in a different room, defendant cannot show that the officers were incorrect in treating the
crimes as distinct and separate. Thus, defendant cannot show that a police report filed in
the paraphernalia cases should have been provided because it was a "police or
investigative report[] . . . made during the course of the investigation or prosecution of
this case" (R. 17) (emphasis added).
Because defendant has not "demonstrate^] that the scope of his request
encompassed the omitted item," his discovery claim fails. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, \ 20.
3.

Defendant's claim fails because he has not made a credible
showing that his defense was impaired.

Even if defendant's claim were otherwise viable, it would still fail because he has
not "ma[d]e a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense."
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987).
In Knight, the supreme court outlined what a defendant must show to establish
reversible error based on a discovery violation. Where, as here, a defendant claims that a
discovery violation impeded his ability to present a defense, defendant must not only
show that the State failed to provide him with requested information but he must also
"present[] a credible argument that his defense was impaired." Id. Only then does the
burden shift to the State "to persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood that
absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been more favorable for the defendant."
Id'
'Knight addresses prejudice from a discovery violation in the context of
undisclosed inculpatory evidence that was used against the defendant at trial. See Knight,
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In this case, defendant cannot show that his defense was impaired. As previously
discussed, defendant had all the information necessary to identify and conduct his own
investigation of the other people in the apartment when he was arrested. See pp. 15-16
supra. Absent some indication that nondisclosure of the police report obstructed that
investigation, defendant cannot show that nondisclosure impeded his defense. See
Knight, 734P.2dat921.
As also previously discussed, the record does not contain either the undisclosed
report nor any indication of the testimony the witnesses named therein would have given.
See pp. 18-22 supra. Absent some record establishing that the undisclosed police report
would have led to relevant evidence helpful to his case, defendant cannot make any
"credible argument that the prosecutor's errors . . . impaired the defense." Knight, 734
P.2dat921.
Consequently, defendant's rule 16 claim fails.

734 P.2d at 921; see also State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Utah App. 1998)
(applying Knight where State failed to provide statutory notice of expert witness allowed
to testify at trial). Thus, it is unclear whether Knighfs burden-shifting prejudice analysis
applies where the evidence was not used against the defendant at trial and there is no
indication that the evidence was exculpatory, inculpatory, or indifferent. However,
because defendant has not even met the lesser preliminary burden under Knight, this
Court need not decide whether defendant had to also meet the greater prejudice burden
traditionally placed on defendants who allege harmful error. Cf. State v. Belh 770 P.2d
100, 106 (Utah 1988) ("Ordinarily, . . . the accused [has] the burden of persuading this
Court that. . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial result would have been more
favorable absent the error.").
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions and sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 2J_ October 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

United States Const. Amend. XVI, § 1
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Utah Const, art. I, § 7
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896

Utah R. Crim. P. 16
Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(a)(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(a)(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(a)(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(a)(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(a)(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the farther
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses
from harassment, abuse or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on
the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(h)(1) appear in a lineup;
(h)(2) speak for identification;
(h)(3) submit tofingerprintingor the making of other bodily impressions;
(h)(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(h)(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(h)(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair,fingernailscrapings, and
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(h)(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(h)(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(h)(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time
of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem
appropriate.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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SANTIAGO DIAZ CRESPO,
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CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
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1775 East Ellen Way
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Oertc of the Court

1
2

separate case from the others?
A

It's easier to file charges with the courts when

3

there are separate incidents in regard to the possession or t

4

paraphernalia when it's different individuals.

5

for the most part gets their own case.

6

MR. PLATT:

Thank you.

7

THE COURT:

Anything else?

8

MS. SISNEROS:

9

THE COURT:

10

Each individu

Nothing further.

No, that's all, Your Honor.

You can step down.

Thank you Mr.

Schneider.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

MR. PLATT: And that is the State's final witness.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PLATT: Yes.

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. SISNEROS: Could I make a motion first, Your

17

State rests?

Want to call you witness?

Honor?
THE COURT:

18
19

Thank you.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

We'll take a bri

recess.

20

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom).

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. SISNEROS:

Okay, Ms. Sisneros.
Given this last testimony by the

23

officer, I would make a motion either for a mistrial or

24

dismissal.

25

(inaudible) at the last preliminary hearing because there was

Apparently there's another report out there and

1

also a report that hadn't been given to me and I made note of

2

that and I told Mr. Piatt that there was a report that I did

3

not have.

4

I do have that but apparently there's another report and it

5

sounds like there's some potential witnesses that could be out

6

there, some names of people that I don't know who they are. I

7

was never told who they were.

8

information.

9

was not given the names of those individuals.

That was Sargent Ross's report.

I did receive that.

I was never given that

Those are potential witnesses for my client and I
I was given the

10

names of Mr. Lucero and Mr. Pollock and that is it. And we had

11

spenfic testimony about the report at the preliminary hearing

12

that apparently the officer doesn't remember being at but - and

13

I was told, and I told him, there's another report out there

14

could I please have that.

15

THE COURT: Well, now wait a minute.

Did you ask for

16

a report specific to this case or specific to another case?

17

Because the testimony was, they filed some paraphernalia

18

charges and reports went with those charges, not with Mr.

19

Crespo and you knew that there were at least five people in the

20

room as reported, right?

21

other names, couldn't you?

22

MS. SISNEROS:

So you could have found out those

Well, the testimony from the

23

preliminary hearing was that these were the only names that

24

they got.

25

any report, in the list of any of the other people.

These were the only names that were listed along in
There are
70

1

no other witnesses listed.

Normally they'll have a list of the

2

other names of the people.

My understanding, and understanding

3

from the evidence at the preliminary hearing was that they

4

never asked them their names, they never questioned them.

5

THE COURT:

Do you have proof of that?

6

MS. SISNEROS:

Well, I've got the transcript.

7

assume you've got the same police reports that I do and

8

they're-

9

THE COURT:

I

But if you asked the question at the

10

preliminary hearing and they responded there were no other

11

names, that's a little bit different.

12

the question then it didn't become an issue.

13
14

But if you didn't ask

I'm assuming, Mr. Piatt, that they got all the
reports that are relevant to this case?

15

MR. PLATT:

Yes, all of the reports that pertain to

16

the possession case.

17

certainly preliminary hearings are a discovery process for

18

defense counsel.

19

transcript.

20

number of people there or those kinds of questioning or these

21

questions about paraphernalia charges and I think it's

22

perfectly reasonable - and this happens in most cases. You

23

have charges that are going to these defendants and then you

24

have charges going to this defendant for completely separate

25

behaviors and officers proceed and they track those separately

The only point that I would make is

I'm looking through the preliminary hearing

I don't note anywhere that there was a great

71

1

and they don't become part of this file because they are not

2

part of this case and had they been discovered during the

3

preliminary hearing, certainly counsel may have made a request

4

for that separate case number but it would require that or have

5

knowledge of it, at least (inaudible) prosecution.

6

terms of relevance, well, it certainly would be relevant if

7

we'd known about it.

8

separate case numbers here.

9

prejudicial effect when a preliminary hearing was held where at

But in

We just don't and we have completely
So I don't see that there's any

10

discovery could have - this kind of discovery could have been

11

revealed through the process of (inaudible) and certainly the

12

State would be held to limited questioning for purpose of a

13

bind over (inaudible) submits to additional questions

14

(inaudible) discovery.

15

THE COURT:

(inaudible).

Well, the testimony so far was that Mr.

16

Crespo was somewhat isolated because of the counter top and

17

everyone was at least somewhere between two to five feet away.

18

I don't see how it would be relevant to his defense.

19

think he's prejudiced by it.

I don't

I'm going to deny the motion.

20

Are you ready to go?

21

MS. SISNEROS:

22

(Whereupon the jury returns to the courtroom)

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. SISNEROS:

25

Yes Your Honor.

Do you want to call your witness?
Defense calls Mr. Santiago Crespo.

Your Honor, can we just for the record make it clear that Mr.
72

ADDENDUM C

e: 1
. DAI043

SALT LAKH POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE KARDCOPY

, Sep. 20 2002

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

neral Offense Information
Operational status : OPEN/ACTIVE
Reported on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2331
Occurred on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2240
Report submitted by K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Org unit : SLC Narcotics Squad
Located at 16 - 155 S 400 E
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper
County : Cncl Dist 4
District : A
Beat : A12
Grid : CEC
fenses (Completed/Attempted)
Offense : #1 3 5 3 2 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS - COMPLETED
Location : Apartment
Suspect used : Not Applicable
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing
Offense : #2 3 5 1 2 - 0 DRUG-HEROIN POSSESS - COMPLETED
Location : Apartment
Suspect used : Not Applicable
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing
aeral Offense Information (cont'd)
Bias : None (no bias)
Family violence : NO
IBR Clearance status : Not Applicable
I Property Segment
Description
Drugs/Narcotics
Drugs/Narcotics

Type
Seized
Seized

Value

I Drug Information
Recovered/Stolen/etc. : Seized
Drug type : Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack
Estimated quantity : 0.200
Drug measure : Gram
Recovered/Stoien/etc. : Seized
Drug type : Heroin
Estimated quantity : 0.100
Drug measure : Gram
.mued . . .

Date
Recovered

Value
Recovered

Page: 2
For.- DA1C43

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

Fri, Sep. 20 2002

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

Related Event(s)
CP
AB

2002-173133
2002-11563

COMPLAINT INFORMATION
Incident Location
Address : 16 - 155 S 400 E
District : A
Beat : A12

GO SL 2002-173133

Grid : CEC

General Information
Case type : DRUG - COCAINE POSSESS
Clrd : 23:31:18
How call received : TELEPHONE

Priority : 9

Clearance Information
Report expected : NO
Founded : YES
Cleared by : NOT FOR OFFICER USE(CITY ONLY)
Reporting Officerl : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Related Person(s)
Case Specific : Arrestee - 01
CRESPO, SANTIAGO
Caucasian/White MALE
Born on Jun-01-1959
Residing at PO BOX 550 , SALT LAKE CITY , Utah 84634Reference Master Name Index
CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ
Caucasian/White MALE
Born on Jun-01-195 9
Aliases : DIETZ, SANTINO
DIAZ, SANTIAGO CRESPO
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D
CERSPO, SANTIGO DIAZ
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D
SANTIAGO, DIAZ J.
DIETZ, SANTINO J.
CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ
DIAZ, SANTIAGO
DIAZ, SANTIAGO JR
Zontmued . . .

'6: 3
: DA1343
Sep. 20 2002

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

: SANTIAGO, DIAZ JR
: CERSPO, SANTIG
: CRESPO, SANTIGO
: CRESPO, SANTIAG
: CRESPO, SANTIGO DIAZ
: DIZA, SANTIAGO
Linkage factors
Resident status : Resident
Offense : 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS - COMPLETED
Arrest date : Sep-20-2002 (Fri.)
Arrest type : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only
rqe Summary
tiarge # 4 8
tiarge Information
Offense : POSS CNTRLD SUBST/COCAINE
Offense date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301
Charge class : FE
Statute : 58.37.8.IB.I.32
General Offense : SL 2002-173133
rqe Summary
tiarge # 4 9
large Information
Offense : Poss Cntld Subst/Heroin
Offense date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301
Charge class : FE
Statute : 58.37.8.1b.i.12
SHO points : 1
General Offense : SL 2002-173133

.inued

GO SL 2002-173133

Page 4
For DA1C43
F n , Sep

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

20 2002

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

Related text paae(s)
Document
Author

PROB CAUSE
K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Subject SANTIAGO CRESPO
Related date/time- Sep-19-02 2301
A/P HAD IN HIS POSESSION ONE SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BLACK TAR
SUBSTANCE COMMONLY KNOW AS (BLACK TAR HEROIN) . A/P ALSO HAD IN HIS
POSESSION A SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A WHITE POWERDY SUBSTANCE
COMMONLY KNOWN AS (COCAINE)
A/P WAS OBSERVED BY UNDERCOVER NARCOTICS
OFFICERS IN POSESSION OF THESE SUBSTANCES DURING AN UNDERCOVER OPERATICN
Document
Author

INITIAL R/O FIELD
K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Subject: Knock and talk
Related date/time. Sep-19-02 2350
Case #02-173120 and 02-173133 are related to each other. Two a/p's, Pollock
and Lucero, were issued misdemeanor citation under this case
number02-173120. A/p Crespo was taken to ]ail under case 02-173133, for
possession.
Sgt Ross received information from a concerned citizen in regards to
an apartment in her complex, ML55 S 400 E #16,) that might be possibly selling
or using drugs. Det Boe-ter lind I responded, along with Sgt Ross, to this
location upon where we did a knock and talk.
Sgt Ross knocked on the apt and Adolph Lucero (the owner of the apt)
opened the door. Sgt Ross asked if the apt was his and he stated that it
was
He was then asked if we could come in and he stated yes.
As soon as we walked inside Sgt Ross observed a/p Crespo attempt to
put his hands down hisjpants. He was asked to keep his hands where we could
see them, ^and oncelie""Femoved his hands from__hi_s__£ants Sgt Ross observed a/p
Crespo_drgp two small baggies "which"were"""later discovered to be black tar
heroin and powder cocaine. Also in plain_ sight_was^numerous drug
paraphernalia
See Sgt Ross's supp.
As I was watching a/p Crespo I observed a/p Pollock pass one of the
ether individuals in the apartment something, which appeared to be a pack of
matches
Once the item/s was in her hand I saw something fall onto the
ground and then the female attempted to kick it under the bed. As I looked
closer the item/s passed was a small crack pipe (brown in color and aprx 3
inches long) and a book of matches. I observed the whole transaction and I
observed no items in the females hand as a/p Pollock gave her the item/s.
All the paraphernalia was booked into evidence under case number
02-173120 by Det Boelter
Det Boelter booked the cocaine and heroin under
case 02-173133. A/p Crespo was booked into ]ail for possession of heroin
and cocaine under case 02-173133. NFD
Document
Continued

ASSTG FIELD SUPP

s

5
DAI043

, Sep. 20 2002

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

Author. K03 - Emery, John
Surnect: A/P TRANSPORT
Lated date/time: Sep-20-02 0451
L was requested to assist city narcotics officers with the transport of
:s a/p Santiago Crespo to jail. This a/p was transported and booked on
i related charges with out incident.

mued

Page: 6
For: DAI043

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

Fri, Sep. 20 2002

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

Follow Up Report(s)
Follow Up # 1
Assignment Information
Assigned to J14 - DeSpain, Amy
Rank : Detective
Crg unit : SLC Narcotics Squad
Capacity : Investigate/Case Manager
Assigned on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) 0823
by J14 - DeSpain, Any
Report due on Nov-19-2002 (Tue.)
Submission Information
Follow Up completed : NO

Continued

/

DA1043

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

, Sep. 20 2002

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

ated Property Report
sport Information
Report Number : 02173133
Property case status : SEIZED
Submitted on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.)
by Boelter, Tyler
Authority for disposal : Gibson, Stanley D
Org unit : Evidence
Offense : GO SL 2002-173133
Location : 155 S 400 E
Apartment : 16
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper
County : Cncl Dist 4
District : A
Beat : A12
Grid : CEC
Insurance letter received : NO
General remarks : KNOCK AND TALK
Related items : 2
fs - Evidence
i # TBI
:us: SEIZED
#: 02173133-1
Name: Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack
"i: Powder
Quantity: 0.20
.: GM
Value:
:ription: WHITE POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P COCAINE
)vered Date:
Recovered Value:
]S : X

*e

js - Evidence
i # TB2
us: SEIZED
#: 02173133-2
Name: Heroin
i: Powder
Quantity: 0.10
GM
Value:
'ription: BROWN POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P. HEROIN
)vered Date:
Recovered Value:
p
s x *e

st Information
Status . CHARGED
Type of arrest : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only
Reason for arrest : Other
Arrest date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301

mued . . .

Page: 8

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT

For: DA1043

GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

Fri, Sep. 20 2002

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

Arresting officers : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas Arrest agency : S.L.C.PD
Summary of facts : CG-POSS COCAINE, POSS HEROIN
Arrest Location
Civic address : 155 S 400 E
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper
County : Cncl Dist
District : A
Beat : A12
Grid : CEC
Arrest Identification
File number : 13666037
Arrest number : 11563
Arrestee Information
Case screened : NO
Notify Victim on release: NO
Juvenile : NO
Diversion recommended : NO
Interpreter needed : NO
Rights given : NO
Mental exam required : NO
Statement taken : NO
Fingerprinted : YES
Photo taken : YES
CD updated : YES
Family notified : NO
Lawyer called : NO Meal given : NO
Coffee given : NO Arrestee's occupatic
Detained : NO
Related General Offense
GOSL 2002-173133
Related People
Arrestee CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ
Born on Jun-01-1959

** END OF HARDCOPY REPORT **

DAVID E. VOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CHAD L. PLATT. Bar No. S475
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South. Suite 200
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff.

NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL
DISCOVERY RESPONSE

SANTIAGO CRESPO,

Case No. 021911370 FS

-vs-

Defendant.

Hon. William W. Barrett

Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its attorneys, David E. Yocom, District
Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Chad L. Piatt, Deputy District Attorney, hereby
provides notice that the following additional discovery was provided on this 16th day of
December, 2002;
1.
Salt Lake Pol ice Department Report 2002-173133, with supplemental
narrative by Sgt. Mike Ross (counsel for both parties having become aware o( said
narrative during preliminary hearing).
DATED this

:

-

day of December, 2002.
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney
By:
,- •. * x

CHAD'L. PLATT
\
-—-—"'"Deputy District Attorney

^

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that tiue and cotTect copies of the foregoing \otice of
Supplemental Discovery Response, was placed in the office's outgoing mailbox for
delivery to Visa Sisneros, attorney for Santiago Crespo, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the

day of December, 2002.

X
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SN9652

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

, Dec. 10 2002

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

neral Offense Information
Operational status : CLOSED/ARREST
Reported on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2331
Occurred on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2240
Approved on Oct-22-2002 (Tue.) by J14 - DeSpain, Amy
Report submitted by K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Org unit : SLC Narcotics Squad
Located at 16 - 155 S 400 E
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper
County
District : A
Beat : A12
Grid : CEC
fenses (Completed/Attempted)
Offense : #1 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS
Location : Apartment
Suspect used • Not Applicable
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing

Cncl Dist 4

COMPLETED

Offense : #2 3512 - 0 DRUG-HEROIN POSSESS - COMPLETED
Location : Apartment
Suspect used : Not Applicable
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing
neral Offense Information (cont'd)
Bias : None (no bias)
Family violence : NO
IBR Clearance status : Not Applicable
R Property Segment
Description
Drugs/Narcotics
Drugs/Narcotics

Type
Seized
Seized

Value

R. Drug Information
Recovered/Stolen/etc. : Seized
Drug type : Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack
Estimated quantity : 0.200
Drug measure : Gram

:mued

Date
Recovered

Value
Recovered

age. 2
or: SN965 2

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

ue, Dec. 10 2002

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

Recovered/Stolen/etc. : Seized
Drug type : Heroin
Estimated quantity : 0.100
Drug measure : Gram

Related Event(s)
CP
AB

2002-173133
2002-11563

COMPLAINT INFORMATION
Incident Location
Address : 16 - 155 S 400 E
District : A
Beat : A12

GO SI, 2 002-173133

Grid : CEC

General Information
Case type : DRUG - COCAINE POSSESS
Clrd : 23:31:18
How call received : TELEPHONE

Priority : 9

Clearance Information
Report expected : NO
Founded : YES
Cleared by : NOT FOR OFFICER USE(CITY ONLY)
Reporting Officerl : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Related Person(s)
Case Specific : Arrestee - 01
CRESPO, SANTIAGO
Caucasian/White MALE
Born on Jun-01-1959
Residing at PO BOX 550 , SALT LAKE CITY , Utah 84634Reference Master Name Index
CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ
Caucasian/White MALE
Born on Jun-01-1959
DIETZ, SANTINO
Aliases
DIAZ, SANTIAGO CRESPO
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D
CERSPO, SANTIGO DIAZ
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D
SANTIAGO, DIAZ J.
Continued

3
SN9 65 2
Dec. 10 2002

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

: DIETZ, SANTINO J.
: CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ
: DIAZ, SANTIAGO
: DIAZ, SANTIAGO JR
: SANTIAGO, DIAZ JR
: CERSPO, SANTIG
: CRESPO, SANTIGO
: CRESPO, SANTIAG
: CRESPO, SANTIGO DIAZ
: DIZA, SANTIAGO
m k a g e factors
Resident status : Resident
Dffense : 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS - COMPLETED
Arrest date : Sep-20-2002 (Fri.)
Arrest type : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only
?e Summary
arge # 4 8
arge Information
Dffense : POSS CNTRLD SUBST/COCAINE
Dffense date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301
Charge class : FE
Statute : 58.37.8.IB.I.32
General Offense : SL 2002-173133

?e Summary
arge # 4 9
arge Information
Dffense : Poss Cntld Subst/Heroin
Dffense date .- Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301
Dharge class : FE
Statute : 58.37.8.lb.i.12
3HO points : 1
General Offense : SL 2002-173133

Lnued

GO SL 2002-173133

Page: 4
For: SN9652

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

Tue, Dec. 10 2002

GO SL 2002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

Related text paae(s)
Document: ASSTG FIELD SUPP
Author: 144 - Ross, Michael E
On the listed date and time I responded with other narcotic detectives to
155 South 400 East apartment 16. I had received a call from a concerned
citizen that narcotics were being sold from the apartment.
When I arrived at the apartment I knocked on the door of the apartment.
The door was opened by Adolph Lucero. I informed Mr. Lucero who I was and
why I was at the apartment. Mr. Lucero informed me that he rented the
apartment. I then asked for his permission to enter the residence. As I
entered I observed a/p Crespo standing in the small kitchen area. I observed
a/p Crespo attempting to place his hand down his pants. I asked a/p Crespo
if he could please keep his hands were I could see them while officers were
present in the home. I then watched as he dropped two small plastic twists
onto the floor of the kitchen area. The two plastic twists were later found
to contain cocaine and heroin. The two plastic twists were photographed in
place and placed into evidence by Salt lake City Narcotic Detective Boelter.
A/p Crespo was transported to jail by uniformed officers.
Several other pieces of paraphernalia were located throughout the
residence.
Document: PROB CAUSE
Author: K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Subject: SANTIAGO CRESPO
Related date/time: Sep-19-02 2301
A P HAD IN HIS POSESSION ONE SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BLACK TAR
SUBSTANCE COMMONLY KNOW AS (BLACK TAR HEROIN). A/P ALSO HAD IN HIS
POSESSION A SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A WHITE POWERDY SUBSTANCE
COMMONLY KNOWN AS (COCAINE). A/P WAS OBSERVED BY UNDERCOVER NARCOTICS
OFFICERS IN POSESSION OF THESE SUBSTANCES DURING AN UNDERCOVER OPERATION.
Document: INITIAL R/O FIELD
Author: K34 - Schneider, Nicholas
Subject: Knock and talk
Related date/time: Sep-19-02 2350
Case n02-173120 and 02-173133 are related to each other. Two a/p's, Pollock
and Lucero, were issued misdemeanor citation under this case
number02-173120. A/p Crespo was taken to jail under case 02-173133, for
possession.
Sgt Ross received information from a concerned citizen in regards to
an apartment in her complex, 155 S 400 E #16, that might be pcssibly selling
or using drugs. Det Boelter and I responded, along with Sgt Ross, to this
location upon where we did a knock and talk.
Sgt Ross knocked on the apt and Adolph Lucero (the owner of the apt)
Continued ...
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SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY

Dec. 10 2002

GO SL 2 002-173133

3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS

m e d the door. Sgt Ross asked if the apt was his and he stated that it
3. He was then asked if we could come in and he stated yes.
As soon as we walked inside Sgt Ross observed a/p Crespo attempt to
: his hands down his pants. He was asked to keep his hands where we could
» them, and once he removed his hands from his pants Sgt Ross observed a>p
>spo drop two small baggies which were later discovered to be black tar
-oin and powder cocaine. Also in plain sight was numerous drug
"aphernalia. See Sgt Ross's supp.
As I was watching a/p Crespo I observed a/p Pollock pass one of the
Ler individuals in the apartment something, which appeared to be a pack cf
ches. Once the item/s was in her hand I saw something fall onto the
)und and then the female attempted to kick it under the bed. As I looked
)ser the item/s passed was a small crack pipe (brown in color and aprx 3
•hes long) and a book of matches. I observed the whole transaction and I
erved no items in the females hand as a/p Pollock gave her the item/s.
All the paraphernalia was booked into evidence under case number
173120 by Det Boelter. Det Boelter booked the cocaine and heroin under
e 02-173133. A/p Crespo was booked into jail for possession of heroin
cocaine under case 02-173133. NFD
ocument: ASSTG FIELD SUPP
Author: K03 - Emery, John
Subject: A/P TRANSPORT
ated date/time: Sep-20-02 0451
was requested to assist city narcotics officers with the transport of
s a/p Santiago Crespo to jail. This a/p was transported and booked on
related charges with out incident.

ocument: INVSTGTR F/U
Author: J14 - DeSpain, Amy
Subject: F/U charges filed
ated date/time: Oct-02-02 1101
facts of this case were presented to the da's office for screening. They
ued an information and a warrant #021911370. These were signed by a
ge and the warrant was activated by the court. Case closed.
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Follow Up Report(s)
Follow Up # 1
Assignment Information
Assigned to J14 - DeSpain, Amy
Rank : Detective
Org unit : SLC Narcotics Squad
Capacity : Investigate/Case Manager
Assigned on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) 0823
by J14 - DeSpain, Amy
Report due on Nov-19-2002 (Tue.)
Submission Information
Submitted on Oct-22-2002 (Tue.) 1215
Checked by : 144 - Ross, Michael E
Approved on Oct-24-2002 (Thu.) by 144 - Ross, Michael E
Follow Up completed : YES
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elusion Information
eneral Information
Agency : Salt Lake City Proper
Cleared status : Arrest and/or Charged
Cleared on Oct-22-2002 (Tue.) by J14 - DeSpain, Amy
Approved by J14 - DeSpain, Amy
arsons Involved
Adults charged:
Juvenile charged:
Juvenile involved:

Males : 01 Females . 00
Males : 00 Females : 00
Males : 00 Females : 00

ited Property Report
*port Information
Report Number : 02173133
Property case status : SEIZED
Submitted on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.)
by Boelter, Tyler
Authority for disposal : Gibson, Stanley D
Org unit : Evidence
Offense : GO SL 2002-173133
Location : 155 S 400 E
Apartment : 16
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper
County : Cncl Dist 4
District : A
Beat : A12
Grid : CEC
Insurance letter received : NO
General remarks : KNOCK AND TALK
Related items : 2
js - Evidence
1 #: TBI
.us: SEIZED
#: 02173133-1
Name: Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack
\: Powder
Quantity: 0.20
.: GM
Value:
:ription: WHITE POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P COCAINE
)vered Date:
Recovered Value:
[S : X

*e

rs - Evidence
i #: TB2
us: SEIZED
4: 02173133-2
i: Powder
: GM
inued ...

Name: Heroin
Quantity: 0.10
Value:

Da
7

9e 8
cr SN9652
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Description. BROWN POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P. HEROIN
Recovered Date.Recovered Value.Flags x *e

Arrest Information
Status • CHARGED
Type of arrest : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only
Reason for arrest : Other
Arrest date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301
Arresting officers : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas Arrest agency : S.L.C.PD
Summary of facts : CG-POSS COCAINE, POSS HEROIN
Arrest Location
Civic address : 155 S 400 E
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper
County : Cncl Dist 4
District : A
Beat : A12
Grid : CEC
Arrest Identification
File number : 13666037

Arrest number : 11563

Arrestee Information
Case screened : NO
Notify Victim on release: NO
Juvenile : NO
Diversion recommended : NO
Interpreter needed : NO
Rights given : NO
Mental exam required : NO
Statement taken : NO
Fingerprinted ; YES
Photo taken : YES
CD updated : YES
Family notified : NO
Lawyer called : NO Meal given : NO
Coffee given : NO Arrestee's occupatic
Detained : NO
Related General Offense
GOSL 2002-173133
Related People
Arrestee CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ
Born on Jun-01-1959

** END OF HARDCOPY REPORT **

